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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTEMrION CLAUSE-DEsIGNATION OF
RACE ON BALLOT STucK DowN.- A Louisiana statute' provided that
in all primary, general or special elections, the nomination papers and
ballots shall indicate the race of candidates for elective office. Ap-
pellants, Negro citizens of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, were candi-
dates in their parish school board election. In advance of the election,
both filed suit to enjoin the Secretary of State of Louisiana from
enforcing the statute on the grounds that it was violative of their
rights under the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment as well as their rights under the fifteenth
amendment. A United States district judge denied the motion for a
temporary restraining order and a three-judge court was convened
which denied the injunction. The case was brought on direct appeal
to the Supreme Court. Held: Reversed. Speaking unanimously through
the voice of Justice Clark, the Court struck down the Louisiana
statute as being in violation of the fourteenth amendments equal
protection clause.2 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
Immediately the question arises as to whether Anderson v. Martin3
extended the traditional application of the equal protection clause. It
is submitted that it did not. Customarily, the clause is invoked where
the complaining party receives state-sponsored differential treatment.
Here such treatment was accorded the appellants. For the state, in
advertising the candidates' race at the most crucial point in an election,
implicitly impressed on each voter that there was, in fact, a racial dif-
ference in the candidates. The legislature so acted with full knowledge
that white voters predominated. The result was calculated and in-
evitable. The Court, therefore, had no other recourse than to announce
that " [r] ace is the factor upon which the statute operates and its in-
volvement promotes the ultimate discrimination which is sufficient to
make it invalid."4
It is well established that a state has the right to require and
subsequently disclose information as a condition of exercising certain
privileges. However, this state right is not without limits. For example,
ILa. Rev. Stat. § 18:1174.1 (Supp. 1960).2 "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3375 U.S. 399 (1964).
4 Id. at 404.
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a significant limitation is that a state must have a legitimate interest
in securing the information.5 Clearly, if the information secured and
subsequently disclosed has no relevance concerning fitness to exercise
the right or privilege involved, it follows that the state has no legiti-
mate interest in procuring the information. Since, by all reasonable
standards, race has no relation whatsoever to fitness to hold public
office, the Court was justified in concluding: ".... [W] e see no rele-
vance in the State pointing up the race of the candidate as bearing
upon his qualifications for office. Indeed, this factor in itself "under-
scores the purely racial character and purpose' of the statute.""
Important to note is the era during which the race designating
statute was enacted. For it graphically demonstrates the Court's cor-
rectness in declaring the statute to be purely racial in character. The
1960 regular session of the Louisiana legislature felt a strong need to
revise the ballot. This revision took the form of a single addition-
the candidates' race. Doubtless, it is more than sheer coincidence that
1960-the year in which the measure was passed-was a time replete
with sit-in demonstrations and public school integration.7 Feelings
were running high against the Negro. The white populace felt an
urgent need to halt the inroads of the black race.
Nevertheless, despite the indicting circumstances surrounding the
statute, it was cleverly clothed in a cloak of constitutionality. It neither
denied the Negro the right to run for office, nor did it require that
only Negroes have their race designated on the ballot. The provision
applied equally to all candidates. Fortunately, these ostensible marks
of non-discrimination were not determinative.
Courts determine the purpose8 and the substance and effect of any
statute and this is particularly true in racial discrimination cases.
Granted, the Negro was not stripped of the right to run for office, but
of what value is one's right to run for office unless the state guarantees
an equal opportunity to win? Furthermore, the same treatment to all
persons does not necessarily reconcile a statute with the fourteenth
amendment. "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.9
These earlier pronouncements apparently were controlling in the
instant case and prompted the Court to proclaim ". . . that which
cannot be done by express statutory prohibition cannot be done by
5 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
6 Anderson v. Martin, supra note 3, at 403.7 Wollett, Race Relations, 21 La. L. Rev. 85 (1960).
s Purpose is defined as "A result intelligently foreseen and offering the most
obvious motive for an act that will bring it about.. ." Miller v. City of Milwaukee,
272 U.S. 713, 715 (1927).
9 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
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indirection. Therefore, we view the alleged equality as superficial." 10
Notable also is that the case's disposition completely harmonizes
with the principle which has grown out of broad extensions of the
landmark Brown v. Board of Education1' decision. That principle
being that the fourteenth amendment ".. . requires a state, in all of its
official actions, to be indifferent to racial considerations . .. "12 The
invalidated Louisiana ordinance patently circumvented this principle
and the Court duly responded.
The Court is to be commended for not seeking refuge behind the
clever framework in which the statute was constructed. Instead, it
opened itself to a possible bitter attack by recognizing that the state,
in singling out the candidates' race, was irresponsibly abusing the
ballot to arouse the passion of bigotry; by recognizing that the state,
in exploiting one of its most treasured functions, was subtly encour-
aging the contemptible practice of block-voting; by unequivocally
declaring that "private attitudes and pressures" toward the Negro
at the time of its enactment could only result in that "repressive effect"
which "was brought to bear only after the exercise of governmental
power."13
Laurence W. Grause
EvimDNcE-Lm DzrEOR REsuTs-EmF-cr OF PRioR S _ LAInoN oN
ADi~assmira.- The defendant signed a waiver which recited that he
consented to submit to a lie-detector test and agreed the results could
be introduced as evidence against him. The test was to be the stand-
ard polygraph test conducted by a qualified polygraph operator. He
knew the contents of the waiver as it was read to him but the evi-
dence showed that he was illiterate and able to write only his name.
At the time of the waiver he did not have counsel, but he was ap-
prised of his rights. On trial defendant objected to the admissibility
of the lie-detector results. He was overruled and convicted. Held:
Reversed. The results should have been excluded, notwithstanding
the waiver. Lie-detector results have not attained a sufficient degree
of scientific trustworthiness, and therefore the written agreement
was not binding. Conley v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 865 (Ky.
1964).
The results of lie-detector tests are inadmissible in evidence, at
l Anderson v. Martin, supra note 3, at 404.
11347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1
2 Wollett, supra note 7, at 92.
13 Anderson v. Martin, supra note 3, at 403.
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